Author:
KURACH RADOSŁAW,KUŚMIERCZYK PAWEŁ,PAPLA DANIEL
Abstract
AbstractCompanies that manage mandatory pension funds are frequently accused of excessive fee taking. International analyses have found that in countries with legal caps, commissions remain within these caps; hence, market competition does not function. Surprisingly, there are few international cases where local regulators implement mechanisms to facilitate competition. The variety of auction mechanisms available raises the question of whether an optimal solution exists for this purpose. Therefore, in this study, we present evidence, based on a controlled regulatory experiment, on the fee-reduction potential of reverse auctions.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
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