Abstract
ABSTRACT: Cheryl Misak has offered a pragmatic argument
against a position she calls “scientific
transcendentalism.” Scientific transcendentalists hold that truth
is something different from what would be believed at the end of inquiry;
more specifically, they adhere to a correspondence theory of truth. Misak
thinks scientific transcendentalists thereby undermine the connection
between truth and inquiry, for (a) pragmatically speaking, it adds nothing
to truth and inquiry to ask whether what would be the results of
sufficiently rigorous inquiry are really true and (b) they can only accept
it as an article of faith that inquiry leads us to truth. I defend
“scientific transcendentalism” against
Misak’s objections.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
2 articles.
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