Abstract
Explanatory problems in the philosophy of neuroscience are not
well captured by the division between the radical and the trivial neuron
doctrines. The actual problem is, instead, whether mechanistic
biological explanations across different levels of description can be
extended to account for psychological phenomena. According to cognitive
neuroscience, some neural levels of description at least are
essential for the explanation of psychological phenomena, whereas, in
traditional cognitive science, psychological explanations are completely
independent of the neural levels of description. The challenge for
cognitive neuroscience is to discover the levels of description
appropriate for the neural explanation of psychological phenomena.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Behavioral Neuroscience,Physiology,Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
Cited by
1 articles.
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