Abstract
AbstractSelf-sacrifice can be modeled as a costly social signal carried to the ultimate extreme. Such signaling may be evolutionarily stable if social status is, in part, inherited.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Behavioral Neuroscience,Physiology,Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
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