Abstract
Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate,
recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective,
and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind.
First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and
mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to
address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities
are necessary precursors in the development of theory of
mind.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Behavioral Neuroscience,Physiology,Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
Cited by
4 articles.
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