PSYCHOLOGY AND REASONING IN THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT, 1935–1939

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article will analyse the psychology and reasoning in the Anglo-German naval agreement and it will hence ask the following questions. First, how did preceding naval agreements influence the conclusion of the Anglo-German naval agreement. Secondly, what were the reasons for Germany to conclude it? Thirdly, what were the reasons for Britain to conclude it? Fourthly, how does it fit into the larger strategy of arms limitations? And, finally, what part did the Anglo-German naval agreement play in the overall strategy of Germany and Britain in the interwar years? In order to come to a conclusion about the reasons behind the agreement it is the thesis of this article that it is essential to include later changes and additions to the agreement. This part has been neglected in previous analyses. Particularly the reasons behind the termination shed light upon the motives for initially concluding the Anglo-German naval agreement. For the British side this article will argue that the Anglo-German naval agreements fit into this general policy line of trying to limit naval armament through international agreements and that they actually fitted into the overall British policy of bringing Germany back into the circle of European powers as an equal partner. For Hitler's Germany, it will be shown that the Anglo-German naval agreement was the abortive step toward an eternal alliance between the two Arian races.