Can Power Be Reduced to a Quantitative Index – And If So, Which One? A Response to Garrett, McLean and Machover-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Can Power Be Reduced to a Quantitative Index – And If So, Which One? A Response to Garrett, McLean and Machover

Published:1995-10 Issue:4 Volume:25 Page:568-572
ISSN:0007-1234
Container-title:British Journal of Political Science
language:en
Short-container-title:Brit. J. Polit. Sci

Author:

Johnston R. J.

Abstract

Garrett, McLean and Machover's critique (see pp. 563–8) of my recent Note on the use of power indices to analyse the UK's stance on qualified majority voting in the expanded European Union Council of Ministers focuses on both my choice of power index and the validity of the use of any such indices.

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP)

Subject

Sociology and Political Science

Reference15 articles.

1. Brams , Negotiation Games, p. 229.

2. Admission of European Free Trade Association states to the European Community: effects on voting power in the European Community Council of Ministers

3. Johnston , ‘The Conflict Over Qualified Majority Voting’, p. 249.

4. Garrett , McLean and Machover , ‘Power, Power Indices and Blocking Power’, p. 563.

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