Abstract
Abstract
Presidents' unilateral sway over policy is of global concern to scholars, practitioners and the general public. While pending actions provoke media speculation about how much authority presidents have to change policy without legislatures, scholarship has yet to systematically measure presidential discretion across areas of public policy. This study surveys an interdisciplinary panel of scholars, using discrete choice experiments to estimate the latent level of discretion that US presidents have in fifty-four policy areas. Consistent with models of delegation and unilateralism, these measures confirm that presidents have more discretion in foreign affairs, and that discretion promotes executive action. This approach presents the opportunity to examine differences in presidential discretion and public perceptions of presidential power, and can be applied beyond the US case.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
23 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. The US Presidency: Power and Constraint;Annual Review of Political Science;2024-07-29
2. TRANSFORMATIONS IN GOVERNANCE;Shared Rule in Federal Theory and Practice;2024-07-04
3. Conclusion;Shared Rule in Federal Theory and Practice;2024-07-04
4. National Consequences;Shared Rule in Federal Theory and Practice;2024-07-04
5. Regional Consequences;Shared Rule in Federal Theory and Practice;2024-07-04