Author:
Chandra Siddharth,Rudra Nita
Abstract
This analysis challenges claims that regime type determines national economic performance, and hypothesizes that the level of public deliberation, rather than broad categories of regime type, is the driver of national economic performance across political systems; specifically, that negotiations, disagreements, and compromises between decentralized decision-making partisans (e.g., citizens, business representatives, professional associations, labor, and public administrators) are the underlying causal mechanism explaining the non-monotonic relationship between different types of political system and economic performance. Countries with high levels of public deliberation more often experience stable growth outcomes, while other countries can make radical changes in economic policy with uncertain outcome. The variation in public deliberation within regime type is significant, especially amongst authoritarian regimes. One startling implication is that, in certain situations, impressive gains in economic growth can be achieved only at the expense of active negotiation and participation in the policy-making process.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Reference102 articles.
1. Democracy and Development
2. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis
3. MATLAB. 2010 version 7.10.0. Natick, Massachusetts: The MathWorks Inc.
4. McKinsey Quarterly Report June. 2010. Fulfilling the Promise of Sub-Saharan Africa. Available from http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Fulfilling_the_promise_of_sub-Saharan_Africa_2603, accessed 3 July 2013.
Cited by
45 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献