Abstract
Abstract
On the currently dominant reading of the Groundwork, Kant’s derivation of ‘imperatives of duty’ exemplifies a decision procedure for the derivation of concrete duties in moral deliberation. However, Kant’s response to an often-misidentified criticism of the Groundwork by G. A. Tittel suggests that Kant was remarkably unconcerned with arguing for the practicality of the categorical imperative as a decision procedure. Instead, I argue that the main aim of Kant’s derivation of imperatives of duty was to show how his analysis of the form of moral judgement is indeed presupposed in the four types of moral imperative that philosophers of his time recognized.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference69 articles.
1. von Vattel, E. (1760) Völkerrecht; oder: gründliche Anweisung wie die Grundsäze des natürlichen Rechts auf das Betragen und auf die Angelegenheiten der Nationen und Souveräne angewendet werden müßen. Third part, translated from the French by Johann Philipp Schulin. Frankfurt and Leipzig.
2. Kant's System of Duties