Abstract
AbstractThe notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will depend on how our psychological theories of belief acquisition and belief change are best conceptualized.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science
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