Abstract
ABSTRACTThe main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science
Cited by
5 articles.
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1. Ethics of Belief in Paranormal Phenomena;Journal of Anomalous Experience and Cognition;2022-05-13
2. Perception and Probability;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2021-03-02
3. Credence: A Belief-First Approach;Canadian Journal of Philosophy;2020-04-27
4. A new puzzle about belief and credence;Canadian Journal of Philosophy;2019-03
5. A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents;Journal of Philosophical Logic;2016-08-19