Abstract
AbstractWhat explains the design of international institutions? Existing research has largely neglected how experience in cooperation in one set of international institutions impacts on design choices made by states in other globally-oriented institutions. We contribute to this evolving debate by analyzing spillovers in experience in international trade. We argue that countries' track record of interaction in multilateral trade disputes affects the design of their preferential trade agreements (PTAs). If a country participates in a complaint against a prospective PTA partner at the World Trade Organization (WTO), the challenge in Geneva alerts the defendant's import-competing industries with respect to potential challenges under the planned PTA. As a result, these industries exert pressure on their government to preserve leeway under the future treaty, leading to increased flexibility and a lower level of enforcement in the PTA. We find support for our hypotheses in an empirical analysis of 347 PTAs concluded post 1990.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Industrial relations
Reference67 articles.
1. Dial PTAs for Peace: The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on Litigation between Trading Partners;Mavroidis;Journal of World Trade,2015
2. Marshall, Monty G. , Gurr, Ted Robert , and Jaggers, Keith . 2016. “Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015.” Accessed 30 October 2020. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
3. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization
4. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover
5. When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献