Author:
Robinson Elizabeth J. Z.,Lokina Razack B.
Abstract
AbstractWhere joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,General Environmental Science,Development
Reference27 articles.
1. Wanted dead and alive: to what extent are hunting and protection of an endangered species compatible?
2. Changing Governance of the World's Forests
3. Burlando A. and Motta A. (2007), ‘Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement’, ‘Marco Fanno’ Working Papers Nos 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ‘Marco Fanno’, Università Degli Studi di Padova, Padova.
4. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Cited by
19 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献