Abstract
AbstractIt is sometimes claimed by open theists that, on Molinism, God controls who is saved and who is damned and that, as a consequence, God's judgement of us is unjust. While this charge is usually lumped under the problem of evil, it could easily be classified under the problem of soteriological luck. I argue that the open theist is impugned by this latter problem. I then show that the Molinist has a solution to both problems and consider objections to that solution.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Philosophy,Religious studies
Cited by
9 articles.
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1. Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck;Midwest Studies In Philosophy;2019-07-09
2. Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck;Australasian Journal of Philosophy;2019-06-06
3. Accepting Moral Luck 1;The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck;2019-02-11
4. Theology And Luck;The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck;2019-02-11
5. The New Problem Of Religious Luck;The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck;2019-02-11