Omnisubjectivity and the problem of creepy divine emotions

Abstract

AbstractOver the past century, divine passibility has become the majority view within Christian theology and philosophy of religion. Yet it faces a serious objection from proponents of impassibility that I shall call the Problem of Creepy Emotions. In this article, I shall develop the objection in detail, and explore two ways for divine passibilists to answer this objection. I shall do this in several steps. First, I will offer some brief historical remarks to help readers understand that divine empathy is the watershed issue in the debate over impassibility and passibility. In particular, impassibility denies that God has empathy, whereas passibility affirms that God has empathy. Second, I provide definitions of important concepts for this debate such as impassibility, passibility, emotions, and empathy. I shall articulate Linda Zagzebski's recent account of passibility called omnisubjectivity, or perfect empathy. Third, I shall examine the Problem of Creepy Emotions that arises from the affirmation that God has perfect empathy. Fourth, I shall explore two different strategies that divine passibility can employ to avoid the Problem of Creepy Emotions.