Abstract
AbstractThere is general agreement that in Italy the establishment of a judicial council ensured an overall higher degree of independence. Nevertheless, this self-governance template was criticized for propping up an accountability imbalance and a certain degree of inefficiency. In order to understand this assessment, this article delves into the relevance of informal rules and practices in the operation of the Italian judicial council. More specifically, it focuses on the activities relating to appointments of court presidents and professional assessment. Based on this analysis, it makes some observations on the factors shaping informal practices and questions their impact on judicial values and the quality of Italian democracy. I argue that informal institutions have amplified the corporatist character of the Italian judiciary, but it would be wrong to portray them in negative terms only, because the operation of the Italian judicial council and judicial system also benefits from a healthy dose of informality, which allows for enduring legitimacy in a polarized society.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)