Author:
BORELLA MARGHERITA,MOSCAROLA FLAVIA CODA
Abstract
AbstractWe analyse the impact of various pension regimes, as shaped by recent Italian reforms, on retirement age, adequacy issues, and redistribution. We add to the literature on microsimulation by accounting for individuals' reactions to financial incentives when deciding to retire. We find that shifting from a generous defined benefit (DB) system to an actuarially fair notional defined contribution (NDC) system induces individuals, particularly men, to postpone retirement. Voluntary postponement of retirement would grant employees a replacement rate comparable to that obtained in the pre-reform DB regime, while the self-employed experience a substantial reduction in their replacement rate.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics,Finance
Cited by
15 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献