Abstract
On the received theory of rational choice, (a) a choice is rational if it maximizes one's individual expected utility. However in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), by this standard, each agent should Defect, since each maximizes no matter what the other does if he Defects. But then both will Defect, doing poorly; better for each if both had Co-operated.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference15 articles.
1. Danielson Peter has argued for a similar position in correspondence, and also, I think, in his “Artificial Morality: How Morality is Rational” (unpublished manuscript, draft 0.4, York University, 1988)
2. Morality and Advantage
3. Moral Justification and Freedom
4. Having Reasons
5. Some Paradoxes of Deterrence
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