Abstract
I argue that acceptance of realist intentional explanations of cognitive behaviour inescapably lead to a commitment to the language of thought (LOT) and that this is, therefore, a widely held commitment of philosophers of mind. In the course of the discussion, I offer a succinct and precise statement of the hypothesis and analyze a representative series of examples of pro-LOT argumentation. After examining two cases of resistance to this line of reasoning, I show, by way of conclusion, that the commitment to LOT is an empirically substantial one in spite of the flexibility and incomplete character of the hypothesis.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
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