1. Id.
2. David Kennedy, Theses, supra note 330, at 375.
3. Ernesto Laclau, Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?, in Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) 36, 43 (2007).
4. See Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, supra note 427, at xii. Compare Lang and Marks, supra note 222, at 447–48 (“[Koskenniemi's] project is not one of revival, but one of renewal and reimagination.”). Whatever (limited) possibility Koskenniemi's “project” holds for “renewal and reimagination” is, as argued throughout this Article, limited to what can be achieved by hegemonic legal practice by “sutured” subjects situated within an international legal discourse defined by a synchronic history of its present, and it is this ontology of international law which, I argue, needs to be challenged. Lang and Marks seem to cautiously acknowledge the need for such a challenge but their reservations about Koskenniemi's “project” are rooted in the “voluntarism” they associate with his work. By contrast, my analysis of structure, hegemony, and suture in Koskenniemi's work has sought to demonstrate the predominantly anti-voluntarist character of Koskenniemi's, on my reading, psychoanalytic-structuralist scholarship:
5. Id. at 374.