Abstract
Within the Council of Europe, the relationship between the ECtHR and the member states is crucial for the survival and effective functioning of the Court. The ECtHR is currently overwhelmed by applications, the bulk of which emanate from a relatively small number of states, notably Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and the Ukraine. The backlog of cases will soon be toppling the vertiginous mark of 160,000, the adjudication of which alone would take the Court more than six years. The sheer number of cases exemplifies the system's urgent need for reform. Lately, discussions have been heavily influenced by considerations of subsidiarity, which the earlier Interlaken Declaration-as well as the recent Brighton Conference-emphasized as the key for the future relationship between the ECtHR and member states. Discussions about the principle's proper role in the relationship between member states and the ECHR, however, are far from over. This is due to questions regarding the principle itself, as well as to the factual realities dominating in the ECtHR-national court relationship. The principle often focuses on a strict separation of competences at two different levels, the national and the international, and many understandings of that principle require that the two levels stand in a more or less hierarchical relationship. This is difficult to assume in the Council of Europe context, where, compared to the EU, neither the doctrine of direct effect nor the principle of primacy in application reigns. Moreover, Strasbourg's emphasis on subsidiarity appears to focus on the responsibility of the member states to remedy human rights violations. In line with that argument, scholars have opined that the ECHR system should focus on an approach in which the ECtHR would be involved only if there are good reasons to depart from interpretation at the national level. Nonetheless, others recently doubted the overall usefulness of such an understanding of subsidiarity, since those member states responsible for the lion's share of new applications to the ECHR often neither possess a functioning judiciary nor functioning judicial or executive institutions, in general.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference104 articles.
1. See Schmitz v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 916, ¶ 28
2. Schönbrod v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1974, ¶ 57
3. O.H. v. Germany, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1975, ¶ 51.
4. The Brighton Declaration expressly recognizes and encourages dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights and the States’ highest courts, including a reference to the optional recognition of an advisory opinion procedure “on the interpretation of the Convention in the context of a specific case at the national level.” See Declaration Brighton , supra note 4, ¶ 12(c)–(d).
5. Id. at 136; Powell, supra note 93, at 288–96.
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