1. SE, 2.
2. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, art. 3–274, Jan. 13, 2005, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 121.
3. 3. One of the main drawbacks of the current setting is that OLAF's investigations are not given follow up in Member States. See The Commission Staff Working Paper of 26 May 2011, at 7, SEC (2011) 621 final (May 26, 2011)
4. 4. see also 11th Operational Report of the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/about-us/reports/olaf-report/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014), http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/eleventh-operational-report-of-the-european-anti-fraud-office-pbOBAC11001/.
5. See Kiiver, supra note 8, at 148, who recalls that the EWM is there for a reason, that is to ensure that EU legislation is not adopted at all costs but only when it is constitutionally justified to do so, and that is a objective one cannot neglected in a system, as the EU one, where the EU legislator cannot legislate in a cavalier manner on the basis of general competences as if it were in a unitary state.