Abstract
This article reinterprets the post-Suez British role in the Middle
East
through a
comparison of the military interventions in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in
1961.
Moreover, it places
these operations in the broader context of the debate about British decline.
It is argued that in addition
to the familiar constraints on British action imposed by limited resources
and
the changing
international climate, the projection of power in the region proved to
be a
great test of nerve for British
ministers and officials. Paradoxically, this proved to be true as much
of the successful interventions in
Jordan and Kuwait as of the earlier failure over Suez. Utilizing very
recently released documents from
British and American archives, the article aims to shed light on the
dynamics of decline at the
microcosmic level, in the belief that insights gleaned here may well be
of value in revising macrocosmic theories of the process.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
19 articles.
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