1. See only Joel Bakan, The Corporation (London, Constable 2004); Troy A. Paredes, ‘A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer’, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (2003–2004) p. 1055; Aulana Peters, ‘Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress’ Response to Corporate Scandals: Will the New Rules Guarantee Good Governance and Avoid Future Scandals’, 28 Nova L. Rev. (2003–2004) p. 283; Robert B. Thompson, “Corporate Governance after Enron”, 40 Hous. L. Rev. (2003–2004) p. 99; Lutz-Christian Wolff, “Law as a Marketing Gimmick — The Case of the German Corporate Governance Code”, 3 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. (2004) p. 115.
2. See Margaret M. Blair, “Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance”, in Peter K. Cornelius and Bruce Kogut, eds., Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in a Global Economy (New York, Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 53–82; Colin F. Camerer and Ulrike Malmendier, “Behavioral Organizational Economics”, unpublished manuscript (21 June 2004) at p. 18; Donald C. Langevoort, “Managing the ‘Expectation Gap’ in Investor Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda”, 48 Vill. L. Rev. (2003) p. 1139.
3. See, e. g., Camerer and Malmendier, supra n. 2, at p. 4; Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, “A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance”, 48 Bus. Law. (1992–1993) p. 59 at p. 60 (arguing that improvements in corporate governance “should be developed and adopted by corporations on their own initiative and should not be imposed by legislation, regulation, court decisions overruling settled principles of corporate law, or bylaw amendments originated by institutional investors.”).
4. See, e. g., Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 1991); Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 1994); Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control”, 26 J. L. & Econ. (1983) p. 301; Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 J. Fin. Econ. (1976) pp. 305–360. Not only the relationships between shareholders and managers but also those between shareholders and directors, on the one hand, and directors and managers, on the other, can be analyzed by agent models. For an analysis of the relationship between directors and managers, see James D. Cox and Harry L. Munsinger, “Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion”, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. (1985) p. 83; Lipton and Lorsch, supra n. 3.
5. On related topics, see, e. g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance”, 55 Vand. L. Rev. (2002) p. 1; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate law”, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. (2001) p. 1735; Cox and Munsinger, supra n. 4; Donald C. Langevoort, “The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability”, 89 Geo. L. J. (2001) p. 797.