1. L. Mitchell, ‘Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law’, 50 Washington and Lee Law Review (1993) p. 1477, at p. 1485; G. Crespi, ‘Maximizing the Wealth of Fictional Shareholders: Which Fiction Should Directors Embrace?’, 32 Journal of Corporation Law (2007) p. 381, at pp. 383 and 386 n. 15; A. Keay, ‘Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law: Can It Survive? Should It Survive?’, 7 European Company and Financial Law Review (2010) p. 369.
2. H. Hu, ‘New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare’, 69 Texas Law Review (1991) p. 1273. Professor Stephen Bainbridge argues that shareholder primacy differs from shareholder wealth maximisation (‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’, 97 Northwestern University Law Review (2003) p. 547, at p. 574).
3. See, for instance, H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, 89 Georgetown Law Journal (2001) p. 439; Bainbridge, supra n. 2, at p. 563; J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’, 41 British Journal of Industrial Relations (2003) p. 531, at p. 531.
4. See, for instance, K. Greenfield, ‘New Principles for Corporate Law’, 1 Hastings Business Law Journal (2005) p. 89, at p. 89.
5. M. Omran, P. Atrill and J. Pointon, ‘Shareholders versus Stakeholders: Corporate Mission Statements and Investor Returns’, 11 Business Ethics: A European Review (2002) p. 318, at p. 318.