Abstract
AbstractThis paper gives a generalization of Jim Joyce’s 1998 argument for probabilism, dropping his background assumption that logic and semantics are classical. Given a wide variety of nonclassical truth-value assignments, Joyce-style arguments go through, allowing us to identify in each case a class of “nonclassically coherent” belief states. To give a local characterization of coherence, we need to identify a notion of logical consequence to use in an axiomatization. There is a very general, ‘no drop in truth-value’ characterization that will do the job. The result complements Paris’s 2001discussion of generalized forms of Dutch books appropriate to nonclassical settings.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Logic,Philosophy,Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Cited by
18 articles.
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