Abstract
AbstractThis article attempts to illuminate a contradiction at the heart of the notion of natural rights. Natural rights are commonly thought to be both inalienable and the property of individuals. As the right or the law is privatized as my rights, her rights, our rights or their rights, rights come to be viewed as personal properties. A distinction is made between personal possession and private property (which entails the title to alienate what is owned) in order to speak significantly of our possession of inalienable rights. For Locke, we possess an inalienable right to life and liberty precisely because we do not own our lives and liberties. Moreover, we can alienate our person, or our ability to labour, precisely because it is our private property. For Nozick, rights are individual properties. Thus, for Nozick as distinct from Marx, one has the right to sell anything (one's life, liberty, labour or soul) at the market price.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
5 articles.
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