Abstract
AbstractLeibniz's principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is the claim that everything has a sufficient reason. But is Leibniz committed to the necessity or to the contingency of his great principle? I argue that Leibniz is committed to its contingency, given that he allows for the absolute possibility of entities that he claims violate the PSR. These are all cases of qualitatively indiscernible entities, such as indiscernible atoms, vacua, and bodies. However, Leibniz's commitment to the contingency of the PSR seems to stand in tension with his inference of the PSR from his theory of truth. I argue that this apparent tension can be resolved satisfactorily. When it comes to his modal views on the PSR, Leibniz's position is entirely consistent.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference44 articles.
1. FROM A METAPHYSICAL POINT OF VIEW: LEIBNIZ AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
2. Della Rocca, Michael . (2015) ‘Review of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Leibniz's Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles’. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
3. Leibniz on Infinite Resolution and Intra-mundane Contingency. Part One: Infinite Resolution;Carriero;Studia Leibnitiana,,1993
Cited by
6 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Law and Physics in Leibniz;Journal of the History of Philosophy;2024-01
2. Science and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Du Châtelet contra Wolff;HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science;2023-03-01
3. Leibniz and the Status of Possible Worlds in advance;Journal of Philosophical Research;2023
4. God Can Do Otherwise;History of Philosophy Quarterly;2022-07-01
5. Leibniz’s Dual Concept of Probability;Journal of Modern Philosophy;2022