Abstract
AbstractEmily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference18 articles.
1. Welfare, abortion, and organ donation: A reply to the restrictivist;Carroll;Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
2. The inconsistency argument: Why apparent pro-life inconsistency undermines opposition to induced abortion;Simkulet;Journal of Medical Ethics,2022
3. Manninen’s defense of abortion rights is unsuccessful;Marquis;American Journal of Bioethics,2010
4. Prolife hypocrisy: Why inconsistency arguments do not matter;Colgrove;Journal of Medical Ethics.,2021