Abstract
AbstractIn hisMetaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not aproperscience (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts thea prioriknowledge of objects of the outer sense, only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its owna prioriprinciples of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
21 articles.
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