1. Some opponents of the doctrine go even further claiming that the distinction between fact-finding and application of law should be abolished, and Strasbourg organs should also intervene in the fact-finding mission. This approach seems to be problematic since it overlooks the fact that the main responsibility for guaranteeing human rights rests, in the first place, with the national authorities, and the role of the Strasbourg organs is subsidiary. Indeed, the drafters of the European Convention did not envisage the Court as a fourth instance of appeal from national court decisions. Moreover, the case-load of the Court should also be taken into account; particularly given the fact that the judgments of the Court are not delivered promptly, such a fact-finding role of the Court should only be considered in cases of extraordinary importance. See Belgian Linguistic, supra note 19, at para. 10; see also Petzold Herbert , The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in The European System for the Protection of Human Rights 49 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, H. Petzold eds., 1993); Takahashi, supra note 1, at 233.
2. Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, The European Convention on Human Rights in the New Architecture of Europe: General Report, in Proceedings of the 8TH International Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights 227 (1995); Mahoney, supra note 94, at 1.
3. Id.; “[m]argin of appreciation with its principled recognition of moral relativism, is at odds with the concept of universality of human rights.” Benvenisti , supra note 2, at 844.
4. Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism;Mahoney;Human Rights Law Journal,1998
5. See D. J. Harris, M. O'Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 377 (1995).