1. Id.; Cf. Moskvan, supra note, at 118 (“To remedy this conflict, one option would be European-level legislation which extends the benefits of the free transfer of funds, FET, and other privileges contained in BITs to all European investors.”); Contra Clodfelter, supra note 80, at 181–82: In the view of some, this conclusion does not mean the BITs' arbitration provisions should be considered inoperative, since these discriminatory effects can be cured by each offending State by extending the obligations it owes to the other State and to its investors to all Member States and their investors. However, quite apart from the practical and legal obstacles to unilateral extension—which, as established in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, would not undo the incompatibility in the meantime—the extension of dispute settlement mechanisms would certainly aggravate the concerns regarding the preservation of the nature of EU law.
2. Cf. Epiney, supra note 102, at 618–19:
3. See Dimopoulos, supra note 71, at 82.
4. Most-Favoured-nation Treatment in Direct Taxation: Does EC Law Provide for Community MFN in Bilateral Double Taxation Treaties?;Kofler;Houston Bus. Tax L. J.,2005
5. Ruth Masona, Flunking the ECJ's Tax Discrimination Test, 46 Columbia J. Transnat'l L. 72, 107 (2007) (noting that the CJEU “managed to dispose of the tax treaty most-favored nation question without any substantive discussion of whether the EC Treaty implies a most-favored nation entitlement.”).