Author:
SHADMEHR MEHDI,BERNHARDT DAN
Abstract
How can one analyze collective action in protests or revolutions when individuals are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution? We model a “calculus of protest” of individuals who must either submit to the status quo or support revolt based only on personal information about their payoffs. In deciding whether to revolt, the citizen must infer both the benefit of successful revolution and the likely actions of other citizens. We characterize conditions under which payoff uncertainty overturns conventional wisdom: (a) when a citizen is too willing to revolt, hereducesthe incentives of others to revolt; (b) less accurate information about the value of revolution can make revoltmorelikely; (c) public signals from other citizens canreducethe likelihood of revolt; (d) harsher punishment canincreasethe incidence of punishment; and (e) the incidence of protest can bepositivelycorrelated with that of repression.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
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