Abstract
ABSTRACT:This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Cited by
5 articles.
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1. You could be immaterial (or not);Religious Studies;2023-08-09
2. How Valuable Could a Person Be?*;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2020-07-15
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4. Our animal interests;Philosophical Studies;2016-10-17
5. How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?;Journal of the American Philosophical Association;2016