Abstract
In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Philosophy
Reference17 articles.
1. AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties
2. Bonanno G. 2009. Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and dynamic games. In Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 09351, Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction.
3. Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games
4. On Rationalizability in Extensive Games
5. On the existence of a ‘complete’ possibility structure;Brandenburger;Cognitive Processes and Economic Behavior,2003
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献