Abstract
Abstract
Nobel laureate James Buchanan downplays any theory of ethical politicians, focusing instead on rules which economize personal restraint, setting lower moral expectations. Through a constructive critique of James Buchanan’s work, I argue these lowered expectations come at a cost: degraded character in politicians, leading to constitutional decay. Buchanan lacks a theory to address choices between (a) action which furthers the politician’s self-interest and (b) action which protects some already accepted, good rule, but which does not further their self-interest. I generate a theory of the Principled Politician, an agent characterized by a prior commitment to fair play.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Philosophy
Reference53 articles.
1. Buchanan, J.M. 1986a. The constitution of economic policy. James M. Buchanan Jr. Prize Lecture. Lanham, MD: NobelPrize.org. Nobel Media AB. 8 December 1986. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1986/buchanan/lecture/.
2. A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues
3. The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan
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