Abstract
Abstract
Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as ‘Orwell is a writer’ and ‘E.A. Blair is a writer’, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of ‘opacity’. Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgement-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the ‘objects of judgement’.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference8 articles.
1. A generalised model of judgment aggregation;Dietrich;Social Choice and Welfare,2007
2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Forthcoming. Judgment Aggregation. Book manuscript available on request.
3. Aggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility result;List;Economics and Philosophy,2002
4. Judgment Aggregation *
5. The Objects of Credence