Abstract
Howard Brody expresses concern that citing the
“two cases that put futility on the map,” namely
Helga Wanglie and Baby K, may be providing ammunition to
the opponents of the concept of medical futility. He in
fact joins well-known opponents of the concept of medical
futility in arguing that it is one thing for the physician
to say whether a particular intervention will promote an
identified goal, quite another to say whether a goal is
worth pursuing. In the latter instance, physicians are
laying themselves open “to the criticism of taking
on basic value judgments that are more appropriately left
to patients and their surrogates.” Brody states that
in both the Wanglie and Baby K cases, the “basic
value judgments” had to do with the worthiness of
maintaining unconscious life via medical technology.
He classifies this as “a question of professional
integrity—but not a question of futility,”
adding that “more than semantics hinges on this
distinction.” The “more than semantics”
factor is a pragmatic, even political one. Failure to make
this distinction renders physicians “that much more
suspect and less trustworthy in the public debate.”
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Health Policy,Issues, ethics and legal aspects,Health(social science)
Cited by
11 articles.
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