Abstract
Anticipating a bailout in the event of a crisis distorts financial intermediaries’ incentives in multiple dimensions. Bailout payments can, for example, lead intermediaries to issue too much short-term debt while simultaneously underinvesting in liquid assets. To correct these distortions, policymakers may choose to regulate the composition of both the assets and liabilities of intermediaries. I examine these regulations in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [(1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401–419] model with limited commitment. I demonstrate that, contrary to common wisdom, introducing a minimum liquidity requirement can increase intermediaries’ susceptibility to a run by their investors.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
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