Central bank credibility and inflation expectations: a microfounded forecasting approach

Abstract

Abstract Credibility is elusive, but Blinder [(2000) American Economic Review 90, 1421–1431.] generated a consensus in the literature by arguing that “A central bank is credible if people believe it will do what it says.” To implement this idea, we first measure people’s beliefs by using survey data on inflation’s expectations. Second, we compare beliefs with explicit (or tacit) targets, taking into account the uncertainty in our estimate of beliefs (asymptotic 95% robust confidence intervals). Whenever the target falls into this interval we consider the central bank credible. We consider it not credible otherwise. We apply our approach to study the credibility of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) by using a world-class database—the Focus Survey of forecasts. Using monthly data from January 2007 until April 2017, we estimate people’s beliefs of inflation 12 months ahead, coupled with a robust estimate of its asymptotic 95% confidence interval. Results show that the BCB was credible 65% of the time, with the exception of a few months in the beginning of 2007 and during the interval between mid-2013 throughout mid-2016.