Author:
Georges Christophre,Wallace John C.
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the consequence of learning to forecast in a very simple environment. Agents have bounded memory and incorrectly believe that there is nonlinear structure underlying the aggregate time series dynamics. Under social learning with finite memory, agents may be unable to learn the true structure of the economy and rather may chase spurious trends, destabilizing the actual aggregate dynamics. We explore the degree to which agents' forecasts are drawn toward a minimal state variable learning equilibrium as well as a weaker long-run consistency condition.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
4 articles.
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