Abstract
Abstract
We document that a significant number of insiders violate the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting requirements by filing open market transactions after the legally required deadline. Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), 29% of transactions fell outside the required reporting window. Following SOX, 8% are delinquent. Violations cluster in periods of high information asymmetry, incentivizing insiders to keep trades private and earn abnormal returns. Collectively, these findings suggest that a subgroup of insiders personally benefit from violating SEC disclosure requirements. Evidence also suggests that blockholders provide governance for violations. Guilty insiders experience a reduction in board seats and an increased likelihood of turnover.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting
Cited by
1 articles.
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