Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers

Published:2004-03 Issue:1 Volume:39 Page:167-191
ISSN:0022-1090
Container-title:Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Financ. Quant. Anal.

Author:

Holmén Martin,Knopf John D.

Abstract

AbstractSweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP)

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting

Reference39 articles.

1. Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns

2. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies

3. Managerial control of voting rights

4. Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights

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