Abstract
AbstractWhile practitioners think highly of randomized studies, some philosophers argue that there is no epistemic reason to randomize. Here I show that their arguments do not entail their conclusion. Moreover, I provide novel reasons for randomizing in the context of interventional studies. The overall discussion provides a unified framework for assessing baseline balance, one that holds for interventional and observational studies alike. The upshot: Practitioners’ strong preference for randomized studies can be defended in some cases, while still offering a nuanced approach to evidence appraisal, one where not all nonrandomized studies are treated equally.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Philosophy,History
Cited by
3 articles.
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