Abstract
What explains the changes in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality? I argue that IMF conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers. The IMF regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances. As a result, these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the IMF and the design of its conditionality programs. I consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier, private financial institutions, on IMF conditionality. “Conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements, coded according to their terms, and two case studies.”
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Law,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
Reference86 articles.
1. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2000. Streamlining Structural Conditionality. Available from ⟨http//www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/091800.pdf⟩.
2. The Catalytic Effect of Lending by the International Financial Institutions
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