Soviet and American Policies in International Economic Organizations

Abstract

In comparing Soviet and American policies we find a paradox: The Soviets, though ideologically antagonistic to international organizations, are pressed politically to at least minimal participation by a concern for influence-building among neutralist countries; whereas the United States, which is ideologically attached to the principle of strengthening international organizations, deems t i necessary for political reasons to limit its commitments to the fulfillment of the UN's economic and social goals. Hence, from their competitive global struggle, their evaluations of trends in underdeveloped areas, and their domestic influences, derive a number of important similarities in Soviet and American behavior.First, both are opposed to any significant expansion of large-scale operational responsibilities by international organizations. This is clear from their reluctance to channel more than a minimal fraction of their total foreign aid expenditure through international organizations.Moscow's support of UN economic programs is a necessary act of political accommodation. Its contributions are minimal and inappropriate to its great-power status, its level of industry and resources. It has never accompanied its vocal support for an increase in the activity of a commission or agency, or even its advocacy of SUNFED, by a concrete or generous offer of financial assistance. The Soviet Union favors keeping programs for underdeveloped countries financially marginal because it is ideologically opposed to the expansion of UN activities. Moreover, foreign aid is an integral adjunct of Soviet diplomacy, and Moscow has no desire to see international organizations pre-empt or challenge the attraction of Soviet bilateral aid.