Abstract
Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy
Reference12 articles.
1. Peter Railton , ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 2 (1984), pp. 134–71
2. Thomas Hurka , Virtue, Vice and Value (Oxford, 2001), pp. 19–23
3. Julia Driver , Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge, 2001), p. 82
4. Philippa Foot , Natural Goodness (Oxford, 2001)
5. Julia Driver , ‘Response to my Critics’, Utilitas 16 1 (2004), pp. 40–1
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