Abstract
This article examines Russell Hardin's interpretation of Hume's argument that great social order depends on coordination convention. The main argument shows that despite an apparent move in that direction Hume's main argument is that justice and the other convention-based virtues rest on a cooperative convention which solves a prisoner's dilemma problem and that states are required when a society exceeds some small size because only states can solve the large number prisoner's dilemma problems that constitute the ‘problem of social order’. In this Hume's argument is indebted to the original form of this argument found in Hobbes's Leviathan.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy
Cited by
5 articles.
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1. Convention without convening;Constitutional Political Economy;2021-08-16
2. The Behavioral Welfare Economist in Society: Considerations from David Hume;Review of Behavioral Economics;2021
3. Convention without Convening: Hume’s Marvelous Innovation;SSRN Electronic Journal;2020
4. Russell Hardin’s Hobbes;Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions;2017-10-10
5. Hume and mutual advantage;Politics, Philosophy & Economics;2012-01-24