Abstract
Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripke–Feferman theory, although it doesn’t probe the compositional axioms.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Logic,Philosophy,Mathematics (miscellaneous)
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